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Abstract 
Mitigation and adaptation are the most important strategies in combating global cli-
mate change. It is expected that in a post Kyoto world industrialized countries have to 
engage in greenhouse gas abatement, and to support developing countries in adapt-
ing to climate change. Within the framework of a non-cooperative Nash game we 
analyze, whether funding adaptation is incentive compatible in the sense that it stipu-
lates mitigation. In particular it is the aim of this paper to discuss: (1) How does for-
eign funding of adaptation affect mitigation and regional welfare? (2) Under which 
conditions is it economically rational to fund adaptation in developing regions? We 
find that, if strict complementarity between adaptation and mitigation exists, funding 
adaptation increases both global mitigation and the donors' welfare, but negatively 
affects the recipients' welfare. The later only benefit, if maladaptation or adaptation, 
which is neutral to mitigation, is funded, which, however, makes the donors worse off. 
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1 Introduction 
Without any doubt, the Kyoto Protocol is an important step in combating global cli-
mate change. Nonetheless, it is relatively ineffective in achieving the long-term goals 
as fixed in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC). A major reason is that the reduction targets set in the Protocol are too 
low, and that most of the developing countries as well as the fast growing regions of 
Asia and Latin America are exempted from the duty of greenhouse gas abatement. 
However, because of the inertia of the climate system, even more radical reduction 
targets would not significantly slow down the rate of global warming over the next 
decade. Consequently, mitigation, which refers to all kinds of efforts for limiting 
greenhouse gas emissions, cannot be the only policy response to the threat of global 
climate change. Alternatively, there exists the possibility to reduce a region’s vulner-
ability to the undesired impacts of global warming by adapting the human society to a 
changing climate. Thereby, adaptation can cover a wide range of different measures. 
Examples are among others early warning systems, investments into coastal and 
flood protection or the planting of drought-resistant crops (e.g. Smit et al., 2000). 
How vulnerable a society is and might be in the future depends on its exposure to 
climate risk and its capacity to adapt, which is a function of societies’ institutions, the 
level of education and economic wealth (see Adger et al., 2003). Unfortunately, the 
impacts of global climate change are unevenly distributed among regions, and the 
societies, which are most heavily exposed to climate impacts and which will suffer 
first, are the ones, which are the least able to bear the costs, and which are the least 
responsible for global warming (e.g. Stern et. al, 2006). This was acknowledged at 
the 2001 Climate Change Convention (COP6) meeting, where it was agreed to es-
tablish three funds for supporting adaptation in the developing world: (1) the Least 
Developed Countries Fund, which aims at supporting the 49 least developed coun-
tries, (2) the Special Climate Change Fund, which provides financial support to all 
developing countries, and (3) the Adaptation Fund, which is based on Article 12 of the 
Kyoto Protocol (e.g. Burton et al., 2006).1  
Although there is general agreement that adaptation is important in combating 
global climate change, there are doubts about the benefits of funding adaptation. 
                                                 
1
 The Adaptation Fund was finalized at the last United Nations Climate Conference 2007 (COP13) in 
Bali. Additionally, several OECD countries, like the United States, Great Britain, Japan and Germany 
have supported more than 50 adaptation projects in more than 29 countries. 
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First, especially the poorest among the developing countries suffer from institutional 
and structural deficits, and hence are not very attractive for funding by the private 
sector (see Agarwal et al., 1999). In this context Banuri and Gupta (2000) argue that 
the Clean Development Mechanism might follow the path of foreign direct invest-
ment, where mainly the larger developing countries and not the poorest, small ones 
benefit. Second, these funds are voluntary, they are poorly funded, and they are ma-
naged by the Global Environmental Facility, on which the developing countries put 
little confidence (see Najan et al., 2003).  
Efficiency and effectiveness are important aspects to consider. But equally impor-
tant is the issue of participation and compliance in greenhouse gas mitigation (see 
Barnet and Stavins, 2003). Unquestionably, for achieving the long-term goals as 
stated in Articles 2 and 3 by the UNFCCC, all counties, both the industrialized and 
the developing ones, must actively curb greenhouse gas emissions (e.g. Najam et 
al., 2003). Therefore, the developing countries, which so far have kept aside of global 
climate conventions, should take over responsibility and share the duties of green-
house gas mitigation. This immediately leads to a question, which is in the center of 
the present analysis: Can funding adaptation be incentive compatible in the sense 
that it induces engagement in greenhouse gas mitigation of both the industrialized 
and developing regions?  
To be more precise, it is not the aim of this paper to analyze the adaptation fund as 
defined in the Kyoto Protocol. We focus on a situation like for example the post Kyoto 
period, where countries are engaged in greenhouse gas abatement on the one hand, 
and where industrialized countries can support developing countries in adapting to 
climate change on the other. In particular, we intend to answer the questions: Do in-
dustrialized countries have an incentive to finance adaptation in developing coun-
tries? Does funding adaptation improve the welfare of both the industrial and devel-
oping countries? How does funding adaptation affect mitigation by developing coun-
tries and how does it affect global mitigation? 
From an economic perspective a major difference exists between adaptation and 
mitigation. Adaptation generates benefits, which are typically private and regional, 
whereas benefits from mitigation are public and global. Therefore, economic rational-
ity seems to suggest that without international arrangements for abatement and bur-
den-sharing industrialized countries have no incentive to voluntarily invest into foreign 
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adaptation infrastructures. If funding were an issue at all, then one would expect that 
from the industrialized countries’ perspective funding mitigation in developing coun-
tries combined with investing in own adaptation measures seems to be justified only.  
In contrast to that, this paper, which to our knowledge contributes the first rigorous 
analysis of the strategic aspects of funding adaptation, reveals controversial results. 
Within a two-stage non-cooperative game, where industrialized countries decide on 
funding adaptation in the first stage, and where all countries simultaneously choose 
their mitigation strategies in the second, it is shown: If strict complementarity between 
mitigation and adaptation exists in the sense that adaptation positively affects the 
marginal productivity of mitigation, then funding adaptation can improve the industri-
alized countries' welfare and stipulates global mitigation.2 However, the welfare of the 
developing countries is negatively affected in this case. Developing countries will 
profit from funding adaptation only, if the impact of adaptation on the marginal pro-
ductivity of mitigation is not positive, and thus, if the industrialized countries fund mal-
adaptation or if adaptation is neutral to mitigation.3 This indicates that the interaction 
between mitigation and adaptation is curcial in decision-making on funding adapta-
tion.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses some important 
interactions between mitigation and adaptation. The basic analytical framework is 
presented in Section 3. Section 4 analyzes under which conditions it is optimal for a 
country to accept funding adaptation, and whether there are incentives for industrial-
ized countries to fund adaptation in developing ones. Section 5 then concludes. 
 
2 On the interaction between mitigation and adaptation 
Today there is broad consensus that due to past emissions the global climate is 
changing and that economies have to adapt (e.g. IPCC, 2007). Thus, climate poli-
cies, which aim for minimizing the social costs of climate change, have to consider 
both mitigation and adaptation. Analyses, which focus on mitigation solely and do not 
                                                 
2
 Klein et. al ( 2007) view complementarity between mitigation and adaptation as the interaction of 
these two measures, such that the outcome of one measure depends on the outcome of the other. We 
do not use this definition, but apply the one of Yohe and Strzepek (2007) instead, who define comple-
mentarity between mitigation and adaptation as the non-negative effect of one measure on the mar-
ginal productivity of the other. 
3
 Maladaptation is an adaptation strategy which increases greenhouse gas emissions and hence, en-
hances the vulnerability of regions to climate change. 
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adequately account for adaptation, yield biased conclusions (see Toman, 1998). One 
must be aware, however, that the answer to the question how to combine adaptation 
and mitigation, very much depends on how adaptation and mitigation interact. For 
instance, the claim that an optimal climate policy should cover a mix of mitigation and 
adaptation strategies reflects the view that mitigation and adaptation are complemen-
tary tools for managing the risks of global climate change (e.g. Watson et al., 1996). 
Unfortunately, the economic literature offers almost opposite views on the interac-
tion between mitigation and adaptation. Parry et al. (2001) argue that mitigation and 
adaptation have to be undertaken simultaneously as they become more powerful in 
combating climate change when combined for at least two reasons: (1) Mitigation can 
buy time for adaptation through delaying impacts, i.e., more time is available for re-
ducing a region's vulnerability through adaptation. (2) Adaptation can raise thresh-
olds, which need to be avoided by mitigation. A typical example is increasing the 
drought tolerance of agricultural production through using more resistant crops. Yohe 
and Strzepek (2007) support the hypothesis that mitigation and adaptation can be 
viewed as complements, but in the sense that mitigation increases the productivity of 
adaptation.  
The opposite view is taken by Tol (2005). He argues that mitigation and adaptation 
are substitutes, as they both can reduce climate impacts, but compete for scarce re-
sources. Ingham et al. (2005) share his argument. Within a simple static model they 
show that mitigation and adaptation are substitutes in the sense that increasing the 
costs of mitigation will reduce the level of mitigation but increases that of adaptation 
and vice versa. This reflects the fact that adaptation and mitigation are almost equal 
options for reducing the social costs of climate change. Buob and Stephan (2007) 
observe a similar result. Based on the assumption that mitigation and adaptation are 
perfect substitutes with respect to their effects on environmental quality, they find that 
whether an optimal policy should combine mitigation and adaptation or not depends 
on the effect, global mitigation has on the marginal costs of adaptation.  
The just mentioned papers have in common that they focus on the main character-
istics of mitigation and adaptation only, and thus, analyze the interaction of mitigation 
and adaptation from a general perspective only. However, a review of the impact lit-
erature, which focuses on applied and detailed studies with respect to spatial and 
sectoral scale, again exhibits diverse views on the interrelationships between mitiga-
tion and adaptation. Case-based studies reveal that the implementation of adaptation 
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strategies may affect the productivity of global mitigation and vice-versa as the follow-
ing examples demonstrate.  
The first one shows that mitigation can reduce the regions' vulnerability from which 
adaptation can profit. As Ravindranath (2007) discusses, land use, land-use change 
and forestry provide significant opportunities to sequestrate emissions of about two 
Gigatons of carbon annually. But blockading deforestation and forest degradation is 
not only an option for mitigating climate change. It also enhances adaptation by re-
ducing the vulnerability of forest ecosystems because the multiple and native species 
of rich tropical forests are less vulnerable to climate impacts than monocultures or 
any artificial forests.  
This is an example for complementarity between mitigation and adaptation in the 
sense that mitigation positively affects the marginal productivity of adaptation. Further 
examples are protected area management, afforestation and reforestation, where the 
latter are also included in Articles 3.3 and 12 of the Kyoto Protocol under CDM. Just 
the opposite effect on adaptation results from mitigation strategies such as substitut-
ing existing technologies through wind and waterpower or biofuels. This leads to a 
cutback of greenhouse gas emissions on the one hand, but negatively affects adap-
tation on the other, since these technologies increase the exposure, and hence, the 
vulnerability of regions to climate change (e.g. Dang et al., 2003). 4 
So far we considered examples, where mitigation affects adaptation. But adapta-
tion might also affect mitigation. For instance, if adaptation includes changing hydro-
logical regimes to enlarge water availability in water-scarce regions, additional energy 
inputs are required (see Boutkan and Stikker, 2004). The same holds true, if space 
heating or cooling is extended in order to protect citizens against temperature ex-
tremes. In both cases the expected effects on mitigation depend of the resulting 
changes in energy use, hence on the fossil fuel content of the technologies used for 
implementing these adaptation strategies (e.g. Klein et. al., 2007). 
Note that adaptation, which increases emissions, is often called maladaptation. In 
contrast to maladaption, adaptation strategies exist, which positively affect mitigation. 
                                                 
4
 Other categories where mitigation strategies affect adaptation include: More efficient energy use and 
renewable sources that promote local development; CDM projects on land use or energy use that 
support local economies and livelihoods; health benefits of mitigation through reduced environmental 
stresses; effects of mitigation, e.g., through carbon taxes and energy prices, on resource use that 
affect adaptation, for example by reducing the use of tractors in semi-subsistence farming due to 
higher costs of fuels (Klein et al., 2007). 
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For instance, the conservation of water in urban areas reduces the energy use in 
moving and heating water (e.g. Klein et al., 2007).5 Nevertheless, note that there are 
many adaptation strategies, which are neutral to mitigation and vice versa. Examples 
from the forest sector are: Mixed species forestry based afforestation, silvicultural 
practices such as thinning, sanitation harvest and fire protection (see Ravindranath, 
2007). 
 
3 A simple model of mitigation and adaptation 
We consider a non-cooperative game, where the players are two regions. For vivid-
ness, they are called North and South. North (N) corresponds to the coalition of 
OECD countries, which have agreed to meet the Kyoto targets. South (S) is an acro-
nym for the developing part of the world, which is free of any obligations to mitigate 
greenhouse gas emissions. 
Integrated assessment of global climate change requires discriminating between 
market and non-market damages. Non-market damages are negative impacts of cli-
mate change such as species losses, which cannot be valued by market prices. Mar-
ket damages are costs, which can, in principle, be expressed in terms of GDP losses. 
In the case of agriculture and forestry, for example, there are market prices by which 
we can measure the value of output losses. 
Integrated Assessment models link market damages directly to gross output (for 
an explanation, see Manne et al., 1995, Nordhaus and Boyer, 2000). For an illustra-
tion, let nY  be the potential (i.e. without climate impacts) gross output of region n. 
Since climate change negatively affects the productivity of inputs, economic losses 
due to climate change are the lower, the more emissions are abated. If we neglect 
the thermal inertia lag between changes in atmospheric greenhouse gas concentra-
tion and the resulting climate effects, then market damages can be viewed as a func-
tion of the stock of atmospheric carbon as well as the region's vulnerability. That 
means, the fraction nnn Y)Ω,MQ(Φ −  of conventional income, which remains at the 
                                                 
5
 Other categories where adaptation affects mitigation are: Tourism use of energy and water, with out-
comes for incomes and emissions; resources used in adaptation, such as in large-scale infrastructure, 
increase emissions; natural resources managed to sustain livelihoods, more efficient community use 
of water, land, forests and other natural resources, improving access and reducing emissions (Klein 
et. al., 2007). 
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regions' disposal as green GDP, is a decreasing function of: (1) the stock of atmos-
pheric carbon Q-M, where Q denotes the business as usual (i.e., without mitigation) 
stock and where SN mmM +=  denotes the total of regional contributions nm , n = N,S 
to greenhouse gas abatement; (2) the critical value nΩ  of greenhouse gas concentra-
tion, which is specific to region n, and at which climate damage may destroy the en-
tire GDP.  
According to the Third Assessment Report (see McCarthy, 2001) adaptation refers 
to investments into processes, practices, or structures to moderate or offset the po-
tential damages of global climate change, as well as to reduce the vulnerability of 
communities, regions, or countries to climatic change and variability. In other words, 
the lower is the climate vulnerability of region n, the higher must be the critical value 
nΩ . And since regional vulnerability can be reduced by adaptation, the most simple 
way to introduce adaptation as decision variable into Integrated Assessment analysis 
is to specify nΩ  as an increasing function of investments into adaptation na . That 
means, green GDP nnnn Y))a(Ω,MQ(Φ −  now is a function of the business as usual 
stock of greenhouse gas concentration Q, global mitigation M and regional adapta-
tion an. This allows to simplify and to represent green GDP of region n by a concave 
function )a,M(F nn
6 with global mitigation M and regional stock of adaptation 
i
n
n
nn aaa +=  as inputs, where 
n
na  denotes region n’s investment into own adaptation 
and 
i
na  is the fraction funded by region i ≠ n.   
Let each region n = N, S act as if it were represented by a self-interested and ra-
tional player, who maximizes regional welfare nU , which has the usual properties and 
depends on own consumption nc  only. Regional green GDP can be consumed do-
mestically and/or invested into mitigation and adaptation. The costs of mitigation and 
adaptation are characterized by strictly convex, twice differentiable functions gn(mn) 
and hn(an), respectively.  
Now, since it is assumed that the North is committed to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions in the long-term, but also has the option to fund adaptation in the South for 
achieving the long-term goals of the UNFCCC, this immediately leads to the ques-
tions: (1) Can funding adaptation by the North provide an incentive to the South to 
enhance its mitigation efforts? (2) How does funding adaptation affect global mitiga-
                                                 
6
 0MFn >∂∂ , 0aF nn >∂∂ , 0MF
2
n
2 <∂∂ , and 0aF 2nn
2 <∂∂ , respectively. 
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tion? To appropriately answer these questions we use a non-cooperative two-stage 
game, which has the following structure: 
Stage 1: The North decides on funding 
N
Sa  units of the South's adaptation infra-
structure. This funding is unconditional in the sense that the South is not 
obliged to meet any mitigation targets. 
Stage 2: All regions then simultaneously decide on mitigation under Nash conjec-
tures. 
In other words, the North may use funding investments as a strategic device in order 
to provide incentives for the South to increase mitigation in a post Kyoto world. The 
South and the North then decide on mitigation after the adaptation funding by the 
North is observed. Finally let us simplify the analysis by using 
Assumption: 
n
na , the investment of region n in its own adaptation infrastructure, is 
exogenously given. 
This reflects the assumption that in each region there is a need for investing inde-
pendently a fixed amount into own adaptation measures as some climate change is 
inevitable in the near-term. 
 
4 Analysis 
Subgame-perfect equilibriums are obtained by backward induction. A Nash equilib-
rium of stage 2 is a vector )m~,m~( SN , which, conditional to the first-stage investment 
N
Sa  into the South's adaptation capacities, solves 
 
Max { )c(U SS  )â(h)m(g)a,M(Fc SSSSSSSS −−≤ }, 
Max { )c(U NN  )â(h)a(h)m(g)a,M(Fc NNN
N
SNNNNNN −−−≤ }, 
 
where ,S,Nn,ânn =  denotes the exogenously given investment into a region’s own 
adaptation infrastructure. 
Since 0gn >′′  and 0MF
2
n
2 <∂∂ , the first order conditions 
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(4.1)  0)m(g
M
)a,M(F
nn
nn ≤′−
∂
∂
, n = N, S, 
 
have unique interior solutions. These enable to define best response functions 
)m~,a(Ψm~ innn = , i ≠ n, n = N, S, which allow analyzing, how the decision to fund ad-
aptation in the first stage of the game affects equilibrium mitigation in the second 
stage.7 
From condition (4.1) follows  
 
(4.2)  )0,1(
)m~(gM
~
F
M
~
F
m~
Ψ
nn
2
n
2
2
n
2
i
n −∈







′′−∂∂
∂∂
−=
∂
∂ 8, 
 
which indicates that region n will reduce its greenhouse gas abatement, but by less 
than unity, if its rival increases greenhouse gas mitigation by one unit. Hence, despite 
the reduction in region n’s mitigation level, induced by an increase in region i’s miti-
gation efforts, global mitigation is increased. 
In contrast to that, the interaction between mitigation and adaptation depends on 
how adaptation affects the marginal productivity of mitigation. Since 
 








′′−∂∂
∂∂∂
−=
∂
∂
)m~(gM
~
F
aM
~
F
a
Ψ
nn
2
n
2
nn
2
n
n
, 
 
we have 
 
                                                 
7
 Note that our model does not allow us to examine under which conditions adaptation funding pro-
vides an incentive to developing countries to engage from zero to a positive level of mitigation. Our 
focus lies on the effects of funding adaptation on mitigation undertaken by the South and the North 
given positive levels of mitigation. 
8
 Note, condition (4.2) only holds, if )m~(g
M
F
n
2
2
′′>
∂
∂
. This is fulfilled for 0m~ n >  producing a net gain. 
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(4.3)  







<∂∂∂<
=∂∂∂=
>∂∂∂>
∂
∂
0aM
~
F  if  0,
0aM
~
F  if 0, 
0aM
~
F  if  0, 
a
Ψ
nn
2
nn
2
nn
2
n
n
. 
 
Therefore, if mitigation and adaptation are complementary inputs into green GDP, 
i.e., if 2 0
n n
F M a∂ ∂ ∂ ≥ , an increase of region n’s stock of adaptation does not reduce 
region’s mitigation.9 But if adaptation negatively affects the marginal productivity of 
mitigation, i.e., 0aMF nn
2 <∂∂∂ , then an increase in the adaptation level of region n 
leads to a reduction in the mitigation level of region n. 
4.1 Interaction between adaptation funding and global mitigation 
As the second-stage equilibrium is unique, equilibrium mitigation must satisfy 
))m~,a(Ψ,a(Ψm~ niinnn = , i ≠ n, n = N,S. Since 0daN = , 0dada
N
SS >= , differentiating 
and rearranging yields  
 
(4.4)  
1
N
S
S
N
S
S
S
N
N
S
N
m~
Ψ
m~
Ψ
1
a
Ψ
m~
Ψ
da
m~d
−






∂
∂
∂
∂
−



∂
∂
∂
∂
= , 
(4.5)  
1
N
S
S
N
S
S
N
S
S
m~
Ψ
m~
Ψ
1
a
Ψ
da
m~d
−






∂
∂
∂
∂
−



∂
∂
= . 
 
By using these conditions we observe 
 
(4.6)  
1
N
S
S
N
S
N
S
S
N
S
m~
Ψ
m~
Ψ
1
m~
Ψ
1
a
Ψ
da
M
~
d
−






∂
∂
∂
∂
−





∂
∂
+
∂
∂
= .  
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 Remember that in case of a production function which exhibits increasing marginal productivity in all 
inputs, then there is complementarity between the inputs, if the cross derivatives are greater or equal 
to zero (see Mas-Colell et. al., 1995). 
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This and conditions (4.2) and (4.3) then prove 
Proposition 1: Suppose, adaptation is marginally increased in the South, then 
0
da
M
~
d
N
S
= , if 0
aM
~
F
S
S
2
=
∂∂
∂
, 
0
da
M
~
d
N
S
> , if 0
aM
~
F
S
S
2
>
∂∂
∂
, 
0
da
M
~
d
N
S
< , if 0
aM
~
F
S
S
2
<
∂∂
∂
. 
 
Proposition 1 states that investing into the South's adaptation infrastructure does not 
decrease global mitigation, if adaptation and mitigation are complementary inputs. 
For, if adaptation increases the marginal productivity of mitigation, then the South is 
willing to take a higher burden of greenhouse gas mitigation. In response (see condi-
tion (4.2)), the North reduces mitigation by less than unity, and global mitigation rises 
nonetheless. Conversely, global mitigation decreases, if mitigation and adaptation are 
non-complementary inputs. 
Let us exemplify this result. Suppose, the North invests into water conservation 
projects in the South to reduce the South’s vulnerability regarding potential water 
scarcity. Such an investment positively affects mitigation, since it reduces the energy 
use for transporting, heating and cooling of water. The South then reacts by investing 
into mitigation to further reduce the energy use as a response to the increased mar-
ginal productivity of mitigation caused by the adaptation funding. In turn, the North 
reduces its mitigation level due to the South’s willingness to increase its mitigation 
efforts. Nevertheless, global mitigation increases, because the North reduces its miti-
gation level by less than the mitigation increase by the South.  
The opposite holds for adaptation measures funded by the North which negatively 
affect the marginal productivity of mitigation. Examples are investments into infra-
structures, which aim at recycling wastewater and which in turn negatively affect the 
productivity of mitigation due to the increased energy use in the recycling process. 
Hence, if the North funds maladaptation global mitigation decreases. However note 
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that funded adaptation, which is neutral to mitigation, leaves the global mitigation lev-
el unaffected. 
4.2 Welfare effects 
From an ecologist's perspective, increasing greenhouse gas abatement has its own 
value, but from an economist's point of view the welfare effects matter. Therefore, let 
us consider the effect of funding adaptation on regional welfare. Given the assump-
tion that both regions engage in mitigation, how does a marginal, but unilateral in-
vestment into the South's adaptation infrastructure affect the welfare of both regions? 
Based on welfare optimization we get  
 
)
da
dm
g
da
dM
M
F
a
F
(U
da
dU
N
S
S
S
N
S
S
S
S
S
N
S
S ′−
∂
∂
+
∂
∂
′= . 
 
Since condition (4.1) must be satisfied, conditions (4.5) and (4.6) imply  
 
(4.7)  














∂
∂
∂
∂
−
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
+
∂
∂
′=
−1
N
S
S
N
S
N
S
SS
S
S
S
N
S
S
m
Ψ
m
Ψ
1
m
Ψ
a
Ψ
M
F
a
F
U
da
dU
, 
 
which, because of conditions (4.2), (4.3), and 0
a
F
S
S >
∂
∂
 proves: 
Proposition 2: Suppose, adaptation is marginally increased in the South, then 
0dadU
N
SS > , if 0aMF SS
2 ≤∂∂∂ .  
 
Now, if there is no strict complementarity between adaptation and mitigation, i.e., 
0aMF SS
2 ≤∂∂∂ , then funding adaptation in the South reduces mitigation in that re-
gion. The North reacts by extending his mitigation efforts, as condition (4.2) indicates. 
Consequently, the South will benefit: It can reduce the burden of greenhouse gas 
mitigation on one hand, while its potential GDP losses are compensated through ad-
aptation on the other.  
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Let us explain this again at hand of an example. If the North funds investments in-
to space cooling equipment in order to protect citizens from increased temperatures 
due to climate change the South will profit, since citizens are now less vulnerable to 
the heat. But these adaptation investments will increase emissions due to the in-
crease in energy use for running the cooling equipments. Since these adaptation in-
vestments negatively affect the marginal productivity of mitigation, the South substi-
tutes away from mitigation to consumption. The North anticipates the South’s reac-
tion and responds with an increase in its mitigation efforts in order to minimize cli-
mate damages. Nevertheless, the welfare of the South is increased, because bene-
fits from higher adaptation and consumption levels exceed the losses due to the 
lower level of global mitigation. In other words: the South’s welfare is increased, if the 
North funds maladaptation.  
Note that the South’s welfare is also increased by a marginal increase of the 
South’s adaptation stock if adaptation is neutral to mitigation, i.e., 0aMF SS
2 =∂∂∂ . 
Since there is no effect of the funded adaptation measure on the marginal productiv-
ity of mitigation, the South does not respond to the increased funding through 
changes in its mitigation level (see condition (4.3)). In this case, the South profits 
from reduced damages caused by a higher level of adaptation and thus, from a high-
er level of green GDP which is used for consumption purposes. 
So far, our analysis reveals an unpleasant result. On the one hand, overall mitiga-
tion increases, if adaptation and mitigation are strict complementary inputs in green 
GDP. On the other hand, investing in the South's adaptation infrastructures positively 
affects the welfare of that region only, if the funded adaptation measures non-
positively affect the marginal productivity of mitigation in the South. This is of particu-
lar importance, if we want to consider under which conditions the North is willing to 
invest into adaptation infrastructures in the South. Therefore, let us discuss: What are 
the effects of funding adaptation in the South on the welfare of the North? 
For answering this, let us consider the North's first stage decision problem. Let Nm
~  
and M
~
 denote equilibrium mitigation of the second stage, then the optimal funding is 
determined by  
 
)}â(h)a(h)m~(g),â,M
~
(F(U{max NNN
N
SNNNNNN −−− . 
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Totally differentiation gives 
 
∂
′ ′ ′= − −
∂
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This implies that the decision to invest into adaptation in the South depends on the 
indirect effects, i.e., effects of changes in the South’s adaptation infrastructure on mi-
tigation Sm
~ . And since 0hN >′ , the North will support adaptation in the South only, if  
 
0
da
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∂
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∂
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However, since condition (3.1) has to be satisfied in equilibrium for 0m~N > , adapta-
tion and mitigation must be strict complementary inputs as immediately follows from 
condition (3.3) and (3.5).  
Proposition 3: The North funds adaptation in the South only, if 0dadU
N
SN ≥ , and 
thus, if 0aMF SS
2 >∂∂∂ . 
 
Overall, our analysis reveals a controversial result. On the one hand, the North is will-
ing to invest into the South's adaptation measures only, if 0aMF nn
2 >∂∂∂ , hence, if 
there is strict complementarity. That is, the North funds adaptation in the South only, if 
these adaptation measures make mitigation more productive. An example is the 
planting of trees in urban areas, which not only protects citizens from the heat but 
also affects mitigation via the carbon uptake of the trees. On the other hand, funding 
adaptation in the South positively affects that region's welfare only, if adaptation 
measures are neutral to mitigation or if no complementarity between mitigation and 
adaptation exists, i.e., if the North invests into maladaptation (see Proposition 2).  
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5 Concluding thoughts 
Within the framework of non-cooperative two-stage game, where in the first stage the 
North decides on funding adaptation in the South, and where both regions simultane-
ously decide on mitigation in the second, this paper gives answers to the questions: 
Does the North have an incentive to invest into the South's adaptation infrastructure? 
Does funding adaptation positively affect the South's willingness to reduce green-
house gas emissions? How does funding adaptation affect global mitigation? 
Overall our analysis reveals a controversial result. On the one hand it is shown 
that the North has an incentive to fund adaptation in the South only, if adaptation has 
a positive effect on the marginal productivity of mitigation in the South, and hence, if 
funding adaptation stipulates the South to increase its mitigation efforts. This rein-
forces the claim of the Intergovernmental Panel of Climate Change that synergies 
between mitigation and adaptation can increase the attractiveness of funding adapta-
tion by funding agencies (see Parry, 2007). Unfortunately, however, the South’s wel-
fare is negatively affected in this case. On the other hand, the South’s welfare is in-
creased through funding, if adaptation and mitigation are neutral or if adaptation re-
duces the marginal productivity of mitigation. This means that the South is better off 
only, if the North funds maladaptation or if adaptation measures are funded, which do 
not affect the productivity of mitigation. 
The results indicate how the present analysis differs from the existing literature. 
We are not analyzing whether mitigation and adaptation are complements or substi-
tutes in the economic sense. Our analysis rather makes aware of the necessity to 
consider the interrelationship between mitigation and adaptation, if climate policies 
should be designed, which include adaptation funding. Therefore, not only our under-
standing of the cross-linkages between mitigation and adaptation has to be improved 
for providing more risk reduction at lower costs as is required by Kane and Shogren 
(2001). It is necessary also to carefully decide on what kind of adaptation measures 
should be funded.  
Besides that, there is a further politically relevant message. As long as the levels 
of contributions to greenhouse gas mitigation are not fixed and thus, voluntary, fund-
ing the developing countries’ adaptation might be inefficient. Consequently, funding 
adaptation should be incorporated into an international agreement, where both the 
industrialized and developing countries contribute to greenhouse gas abatement. In a 
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cooperative world, the positive externalities, which greenhouse gas abatement by 
one region has on the welfare of the other, are completely internalized. Thus, in a 
social optimum mitigation as well as the funded adaptation are higher than in a world, 
where countries act non-cooperatively. Furthermore, the optimal adaptation funding is 
independent of whether mitigation and adaptation are complementary or non-
complementary inputs (see Appendix for more details) .The results of the cooperative 
game then allow defining the interrelationship between mitigation and the funded ad-
aptation in an international agreement. However, we leave the analysis of such an 
international agreement on the optimal funding of adaptation and mitigation to future 
research. 
Obviously, there are further options for extending the present analysis. One could 
be to account for the differences in the time horizons, on which mitigation and adap-
tation become effective, since due to the inertia of the climate system the benefits of 
mitigation accrue in the long-term, whereas the benefits of adaptation are likely to be 
experienced in the short-term. This would mean making the model a dynamic one. An 
extension of the analysis could be to allow for uncertainty. For example, benefits of 
greenhouse gas mitigation could be viewed as uncertain, because it might take dec-
ades until mitigation will become effective. Conversely, the benefits of adaptation can 
be viewed less uncertain, since the benefits of adaptation may occur within a much 
shorter time. 
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Appendix 
Let nm , n = N,S, and 
N
Sa  denote the Pareto-efficient levels of mitigation and funded 
adaptation, respectively, which result from maximizing the welfare function 
 
  )c(Uα)c(Uα SSSNNN + , 
 
where αn, n = N,S, defines a region specific weight, subject to the budget constraints  
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First order conditions entail in case of interior solutions  
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Condition (5.1) implies that in a cooperative world the positive externalities mitigation 
by one region imposes on the other are internalized. Therefore, both regional and 
global mitigation is higher than in a non-cooperative equilibrium (see condition (4.1)). 
Furthermore note that the socially optimal mitigation level of the North is an increas-
ing function of αS. In other words, the higher the value placed on the well-being of the 
South the more greenhouse gases must be mitigated to achieve the first-best opti-
mum. 
Condition (5.2) shows that it is Pareto-optimal to fund adaptation, if the marginal 
benefits of the South equal to the marginal costs the North has to bear. This is in 
contrast to what was observed in the non-cooperative game, where the decision to 
support adaptation depends on indirect effects and thus, on whether there is com-
plementarity between mitigation and adaptation. Again, the higher the weight placed 
on the welfare of the South, the higher optimal investments into adaptation funding 
need to be to achieve the social optimum.  
Now, combining (5.1) and (5.2) yields 
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This defines the relationship between optimal funding of adaptation 
N
Sa  and optimal 
mitigation nm , n= N,S, which need to hold in an international agreement where fund-
ing adaptation depends on regional efforts for curbing greenhouse gas emissions. 
